

CHANGING CONTOURS OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT

History of Indo –Pak relation is the history of un resolved conflicts. Since their independence in 1947, the relations between the two countries have been in the state of constant flux. Several decades of armed conflict, bilateral talks and gradually rising trust deficit have become distinctive features of mutual Indo-Pakistani relations. Even though they share linguistic, cultural, geographic, and economic links, their relationship has been plagued by hostility and suspicion. Both India and Pakistan hold different views regarding their perception about the causes of conflict; to Pakistan it is Kashmir, where as for India it is Cross-border terrorism across the LOC, supported by Pakistan. The Indo-Pak conflict has also hampered the development of economic and trade cooperation between them. Time is ripe when both the countries should try to resolve their differences and move towards peace and cooperation. Indeed, peace between India and Pakistan is the prerequisite for achieving stability and development in the greater South Asian region. Efforts have been made persistently at both bilateral and multilateral levels to normalize the relationship between these key South Asian neighbours; however, these attempts only resulted in limited success. This paper is intended to examine the bilateral, regional and global factors leading to the dynamics in Indo-Pak relation. The methodology is qualitative in nature along with both primary and secondary has been used and examined. The primary source includes official documents, statements and the secondary source includes books, magazine, journals and newspapers etc.

Keywords: *Contours, India, Pakistan, Relations.*

INTRODUCTION

India and Pakistan before emerging as two separate entities were united in one single entity (India). It was a part of British colonial empire for a long period. After a long freedom struggle, British decided to free India. Thus

India and Pakistan emerged as two separate states under Indian Independence Act on 15th August, 1947. The location of India is in the southern peninsula of the Asian continent; its neighbours are China and Nepal in the North, Pakistan in the North West and Burma and Bangladesh in the east, and its total area is 32, 87,263 sq.km.¹ India adopts parliamentary form of government and succeeded in strengthening the roots of democracy on the one hand and on the other, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is bordered by India in the south and east and in the West by Afghanistan and Iran. The total area of Pakistan was 365, 529 sq. miles (East Pakistan 55,126 sq. miles and West Pakistan 310,403 sq miles). Pakistan also adopts democratic form of government, but is struggling in consolidating democracy.²

The partition of the subcontinent relied on the Mountbatten's Plan (3, June, 1947). India and Pakistan were created two states under the partition plan and princely states were asked to accede to either India or Pakistan. While acceding to either dominion, Princes had to keep in mind the geographical position and wishes of the people. There were some 562 princely states which acceded to India and Pakistan, but the status of Jammu and Kashmir became contested. Maharaja Hari Singh harboured a vision to remain independent. He postponed his decision on accession.³ When the Muslim peasants' (especially in Poonch) rebelled against the Dogra Rajput's, land owners within Kashmir, it is believed that Pakistan sent tribal's from North West Frontier Provinces (N.W.F.P). In response Maharaja signed instrument of accession with India for military help.⁴

KASHMIR IN UNITED NATIONS (UN)

The genesis of Kashmir issue at the international level began, with India taking Kashmir issue to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on 1, January, 1948.⁵ It was a request on the part India to UNSC under United Nations (UN) charter Chapter VI and Art. 35 of the peaceful settlement of disputes and not for "action" with respect to acts' of aggression as provided for in chapter VII of the charter.⁶ The government of Pakistan denied the aggression and presence of troops on soil of Kashmir. But when a three member committee UNCIP visited the actual scene then Pakistan accepted the presence of troops.⁷ Gopala Swami Ayenger, Indian representative in the UN made clear in his statements that J&K acceded to Indian Union and it is now Indian responsibility to protect

¹ S.S.Bindra; "Indo-Pak Relation", *Deep and Deep*, New Delhi, 1981, p.18

² Ibid; p.18.

³ Chris Ogden "Tracing the Pakistan - Terrorism Nexus in Indian security Perspectives; From 1947 to 2011" pp.38-39, *India Quarterly*.

⁴ Ibid; p. 39

⁵ *The Reader*; 30, April, 2015

⁶ Sisir Gupta; "Kashmir: A Study in India- Pak relation," Asian Publishing House, New Delhi 1965, p. 140.

⁷ UN resolutions are on the lips of every 'freedom leader' but is there an option for freedom; *Epilogue*; February 2011, Vol. 5.

its territory from the external invasion. Zaffar- ullah Khan was pleading Pakistan's side, who in his speech questioned the “*accession*”. He refused the charges made by the Indian dominion.⁸ On 15, February, 1948, the UN resolution called for an immediate ceasefire and sought holding of plebiscite to decide the future of the state. By 21, April, 1948, the UN among other issues increased the number of members of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) from 3 to 5 and recommended to the government of India and Pakistan for:

- (1) The withdrawal of all tribesmen and Pakistanis,
- (2) The reduction of force level by India on restoration of normalcy ,
- (3) The appointment of plebiscite administration by India and
- (4) The appointment of plebiscite administrator by the UN Secretary General. On August 13, 1948 the UN adopted another resolution.⁹

KARACHI AGREEMENT 1949

India approached UN on 1, January, 1948, for the peaceful solution of Kashmir problem (or for protection Indian territorial integrity). In February 1948 the UN resolution asked the two countries for immediate ceasefire. On 13 August, 1948 resolution UN again asked the two countries for ceasefire. Thus ceasefire agreement was concluded by India and Pakistan On 1, January, 1949 in Karachi (Pakistan) under the auspices of the United Nation. The ceasefire agreement came to be known as Karachi Agreement. The ceasefire line divided Kashmir, with nearly two third of state under Indian control and rest under Pakistan, which the later called ‘*Azad* ’or ‘*Free Kashmir*’. The ceasefire line was monitored by a UN observer mission until 1972, when it was renamed as line of control (Loc).¹⁰

Since independence, Jammu and Kashmir has been the bone of contention between the two, they have fought four wars; 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999. Three had origin on Kashmir dispute, but failed to resolve the dispute.¹¹

⁸ Sisir Gupta; *pp. 141 – 144.*

⁹ (January 5, 1949, the two earlier resolutions were amalgamated into a single resolution... UN authorizes different persons for seeking the implementation of UN resolution like (a) Admiral Chester Nimitz of US Navy March 22, 1949, (b) General McNaughton of Canada (the then UN President) ,(c) Sir Owen Australian judge March 1950 (d) Dr Frank Graham March 30, 1951) ,(e) UN later authorized Gunnar Jarring, the UN President, to visit India and Pakistan to seek demilitarization. Thus UN involvement in Kashmir issue for 23 year (1947-71), passed 23 resolution, but none among them worked. See Epilogue, February 2011. Vol 5 Issus 02 also available at, www.epilogue.in.

¹⁰ T.V.Paul; “ *The India-Pakistan conflict; An Enduring Rivalry*” Cambridge University Press 2006, p.8

¹¹ Mushtaq Ahmad Mir; “ *India –Pakistan; the History of Unsolved Conflicts,*” IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS) Volume 19, Issue 4, Ver. II (Apr. 2014), www.iosrjournals.org

In the 1990s there was shift Indo-Pak relation; peace process was started by the two states with view to normalize relations. It was during the campaign of General Elections of February, 1997 in Pakistan, Mian Nawaz Sharif, leader of Pakistan Muslim League (N), declared his wish for the normalization of relations with India as his top priority. He made clear statements and highlighted the significance of serious talks with India on Kashmir and a need to improve relations with India. .¹²

He told Sartaj Aziz that he deliberately raised the issue in the campaign so that people should accept his negotiations with India in the days to come. He won a convincing electoral majority. Coming into power, he immediately focused his attention to resume talks with India.¹³ The then Prime Minister of India, H. D. Deve Gowda congratulated Mian Nawaz Sharif on his triumph. In his reply, the Prime Minister of Pakistan suggested to start talks at foreign secretary level between the two countries. They decided to take an initiative to resume the talks which had been stalled since 1994. Some international circles especially the U.S. also put their weight behind the resumption of talks.¹⁴ The foreign secretaries of Pakistan and India, Shamshad Ahmad and Salman Haider respectively, held meetings in New Delhi from 28th to 31st March, 1997. On 9, April, 1997, Pakistani Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan held a breakfast session with Indar Kumar Gujral, the Minister for External Affairs of India. The meeting was held in the backdrop of the Non-Aligned Movement session in New Delhi. They decided to continue the dialogue and next meeting was scheduled to be held in Islamabad in June 1997. In April, 1997, Inder Kumar Gujral became Prime Minister of India. Mian Nawaz Sharif greeted Gujral and emphasized the need for enhancing the relationship between the two neighbour.¹⁵ On 12th, May, 1997, Pakistani Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif and Indian Premier Inder Kumar Gujral had a meeting on the sidelines of 9th SAARC Summit at Male (Maldives). It was another positive development in their relations. The first major step towards peace process was structured composite dialogue. So the genesis of structured or composite dialogue process can be traced from 1997, Prime ministerial meeting at Male¹⁶. The composite dialogue consisting of eight “baskets of security”, all of which were expected to be discussed simultaneously. The format for the talks was a “two plus six formula” where the two most important issues in both Indian and Pakistani perspectives — the

12 Sartaj Aziz; *“Between Dreams and Realities”*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 219.

13 . Thomas P. Thornton; *“A Long Way to Lahore: India and Pakistan Negotiate”* in Craig Baxter, Charles H. Kennedy, (eds), *Pakistan 2000*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.67.

14 Amjad Abbas Maggsi; *“Lahore Declaration February, 1999 A Major Initiative for Peace in South Asia”*, *Pakistan Vision* Vol. 14 No. 1, p. 185

15 Ibid; pp. 185,186

16 . Mussarat Jabeen, Muhammad Saleem, Mazhar, Naheed, S. Goraya;” *SAARC and Indo-Pak Relationship”* *Journal of political Studies*, Vol. 1, Issue 2, p.135

Kashmir issue and peace and security — was to be handled at the level of foreign secretaries while the rest of the six issues would-be handled by other relevant secretaries and technical committees.¹⁷

Based on a compromise approach, the peace process enabled the two countries to discuss all issues including Jammu and Kashmir, simultaneously. Since its inception, the dialogue process has gone through numerous highs and lows in bilateral relations. It has remained susceptible to unforeseen incidents which have derailed the process several times in the past. However, since April 2003 it has progressed steadily till the 26, November, 2008 Mumbai terror attacks when the dialogue process was suspended for a long time.¹⁸

Thus it was a compromise in the sense that while India agreed to include Kashmir in the agenda for talks, Pakistan relented to include terrorism, the two major irritants in bilateral relations. The earlier talks proved fruitless, because India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests on 11th and 28th May 1998 respectively. Both countries developed their nuclear program owing to different reasons. India claimed its nuclear programme as multipurpose and one reason was to equate China in nuclear capability and was also worry of Sino-Pakistan relations while Pakistan's aim was to balance the nuclear factor in the region.¹⁹ subsequently composite dialogue collapsed under the impact of the Kargil conflict in 1999. Although the two rounds of talks in 1998 (16–18 October and 5–13 November) had not seemed particularly propitious, the Lahore summit that followed seemed to have produced breakthrough. However, no negotiations were likely to be able to survive the subsequent war and recriminations. From that point, the possibilities of a Composite Dialogue seemed distant as the Nawaz Sharif's government in Pakistan was overthrown by a military coup and the new leader, General Pervez Musharraf, condemned the Lahore summit for allowing India, in effect, to avoid addressing the violence in Kashmir.²⁰

Following Kargil War of 1999, failure Agra Summit, the December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament by terrorists brought a “brink of war” situation which continued for 10 months from December 2001 to October 2002. However, in April 2003, India began what it described as a step-by-step initiative towards Pakistan, and in early May 2003, Pakistan responded favourably calling for a resumption of the composite dialogue process.²¹The 12th SAARC Summit held at Islamabad in January, 2004 provided an opportunity to

17 Baruah, A.” *India Pakistan Official Level talks from February 16*”. *The Hindu*, 28,January, 2004 <http://www.hindu.com/2004/01/28/stories/2004012807400100.htm>

18 Sajad Padder; “*The Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan: Structure, Process and Agency*”, South Asia Institute, Department of Political Science Heidelberg University Working Paper No. 65 February 2012, p. 1

19 Op. cit. p.135

20 Op.cit; p. 2

21 Sumona Dasgupta; “*Kashmir and India-Pakistan composite dialogue*”, S.Rajaratnam school of international studies Singapore, 21 , May , 2015 p. 5

improve relations, where the then prime minister of India, and Parvez Musharraf Pakistani president decided to reactivate peace process. As result composite dialogue process was resumed in June, 2004. By the end of October 2004, India and Pakistan had established three forms of communications within the composite dialogue, back channel meetings between the national security advisors and meetings between the country's top political leadership. The composite dialogue between India and Pakistan from 2004-2008 had completed four rounds and the fifth was in progress when it was stopped following the dramatic terrorist attacks in Mumbai on 26 November 2008.²² The issues included in the composite dialogue process and the levels at which they were to be addressed.²³

According to Kenneth Waltz, the neo realist thinker who suggests three levels of analysis to study international politics viz individual level, state and international level analysis within this theoretical framework, the factors leading to dynamics in Indo-Pak relations are:

Globalisation:- Globalisation in its economic perspective stands for the openness of trade, strengthening economic ties at bilateral and regional and global level. The globalisation process accelerated its pace since 1990 which led to the integration in regional groupings. Analysing the case study of the European Union (EU) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), one learns that, Europe united following the collapse of Communism in early 1990s. With the fall of the Berlin Wall,²⁴ the Europeans buried their hatchets for the sake of the economic well-being of their people and regional development. In 1993, upon finalization of 'Maastricht Treaty' on European Union²⁵, a single market of Europe came into being, based on freedom of movement of goods, services, people and money. Since its inception, ASEAN has successfully nurtured the cooperation in political, economical, social and cultural fields with shared interest.²⁶ The leadership of these regions had the political will and determination to resolve their bilateral differences and political issues for a greater cause; the regional concord, stability and economic prosperity.

This globalisation process has affected Indo-Pak relations too; it proved to be a factor in normalising India –Pakistan relation. India opened up its economy and adopted Liberalisation, Globalisation and Privatisation (LPG) model and it required good friendly relation with neighbours, this is why we witness that it gave Most Favoured Nation status (MFN) to Pakistan in 1996. In spite of all the differences between the two countries, both sides, especially the business community, continued made effort for increasing trade. Irrespective of domestic

22 . Ibid; pp.6, 7

23 . Ibid; p. 3

24 William F. Buckley JR; *"The Fall of Berlin Wall"*, John Wiley and Sons, Inc, New Jersey, 2004, p. 6

25 The History of the European Union, The Official website of EU, at: http://europa.eu/about-eu/euhistory/index_en.htm.

26 Mohamad Faisol Keling; *"The Development of ASEAN from Historical Approach"*, Canadian Center of Science and Education 169, Asian Social Science Vol. 7, No. 7; Kuala Lumpur, July 2011. Available at <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/12122063.pdf>

pressures, govt. in both countries pitched for more harmonious ties.²⁷ Slightly the bilateral trade between the two Countries increased though it is still below the potential level.²⁸

End of Cold War Politics: - Historically, the Indo-Pak independence was marked by the beginning of the cold war, which was characterized by the realist paradigm of international relations. Realists believed that peace and security through strength is the organizing principle of international relations.²⁹ Having been positioned in opposite ideological blocks, India and Pakistan remained hostile to each other over numerous issues, indeed, one of the most critical but unresolved issues of contemporary international relations.³⁰ The end of the cold war provided India and Pakistan with opportunities to develop the concept of cooperative peace and security. The desire for peace, recognition of the futility of confrontation and the utility of confidence-building measures, the cumulative impact of ‘track two diplomacy’ and the intent to succeed in a dialogue process have all strengthened the peace process in recent years.³¹ External powers had been instrumental in the process of regional peace making. There was no superpower rivalry, these powers persuaded the big actors in the region to normalise relation and initiate peace process. Post-cold war developments have changed the US’s attitude to sub continental affairs. The US accepts that there are possibilities of better relations with India. It also accepts India’s security concerns. However, this does not dilute US relations with Pakistan. Pakistan remains important to US interests in the region and ‘constructive engagement’ is useful and necessary for monitoring and controlling cross-border terrorism and religious extremism. Linkage with Pakistan is also considered necessary in maintaining an atmosphere of restraint in the region in the context of the nuclear weaponisation of India and Pakistan. The US wooed Pakistan during the cold war period, in particular after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. That era is dead and those compulsions are now gone. In the post-cold war era, Pakistan has little choice but to go along with US interests, ending its isolation and carving out a new role as a frontline state fighting the Islamic militants in South Asia.³² So the American stance was also tilted towards the reconciliation process between nuclear states India and Pakistan due to their heavy involvement in Afghanistan’s War on Terror.

²⁷ Tridivesh Smainiand, Manish Vaid; “*Indo-Pak Trade A visit to Historical Relation*,” “consumer unit & Trust Society(CUTS) international 2012, p..2

²⁸ Since 1990 the bilateral trade between India and Pakistan has increased from 86 million (US dollar) to 2 billion (US dollar), See Gill, Sucha Singh and others, *Economic Cooperation and Infrastructural Linkages between Two Punjab’s: Way Ahead*. Chandigarh: Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development, 2010 and D.G.C.I. & S., Kolkata and Ministry of Commerce, Government of India

²⁹ Ali Ahmed; “*Towards Detente in South Asia*”, South Asian Journal, Issue 27, Jan-Mar 2010, p.137.

³⁰ Raja Muhammad Khan; “*The Dynamics of Indo-Pak Peace Process*,” Available at, www.ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/ndu.../NDU.../03-Dynamics-of-Indo-Pak.

³¹ Sanjeeb Kumar Mohanty; “*Post-cold war Indo-Pak friendship -Giving peace a chance after 9/11*”. Available at, ias.asia/sites/default/files/IIAS_NL46_15.

³² Ibid.

Development of Nuclear Weapons/ Nuclear tests:- The use of strategies like CBMs became all the more important before India and Pakistan as both countries have acquired nuclear status. Therefore, it became inevitable for them to normalise their relations to avoid possibility of nuclear holocaust between the two neighbours.³³ The nuclear capability retained by India and Pakistan made south Asian region a nuclear war zone, it worsened the security situation for over a billion people in the subcontinent³⁴ This proved to be a factor in institutionalising the peace process, as L.K Advani claimed that India's decisive step to become a nuclear weapon state has brought about a qualitatively new state in India–Pakistan relations, particularly in finding a lasting solution to the Kashmir problem'. In the intervening period, there has been no evidence of any solution to the Kashmir problem, but it is clear that there is now a qualitatively new state of relations between the two countries— an altogether more dangerous one. The one redeeming feature, in the aftermath of the nuclear tests, has been the emergence of an active peace movement in indo Pak relation. There are civil society groups working for nuclear disarmament and peace.³⁵

Mumbai Attack 2008:- The Mumbai attack hindered the peace process between India and Pakistan and damaged all efforts that were being made in order to achieve harmonized relations between both states. The Indian authorities raised voice against the terror intentions of Pakistan and symbolized her as the epicenter of terrorism. India blamed Lashkar-e-Tayba for targeting the Indian nationals.³⁶ The attack proved to be sunset in the ongoing Indo-Pak peace dialogues. India postponed all the secretary levels talks on trade, Siachen and Sir Creek. It also cancelled the cricket tour of Pakistan, the meeting of Indian Pakistan Joint Commission on Environment and tensed the visa issuance process for the Pakistani nationals. India opened all the option and highlighted its war alertness to encounter terrorism and concentrated to influence the international community against the Pakistani extremism. Pakistan responded with the same preparedness, the Pakistani military and Political authorities made it clear that they ready to face the war consequence in order to defend their country. Both countries put forces on high alert and Pakistani also pulled out troops from the insurgency-hit areas to deploy them along borders with India.³⁷

³³ Available at: shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/94163/6/06_chapter%201

³⁴ On 11 and 13 May 1998 India carried out a series of 5 nuclear explosions. Pakistan conducted its own series of 6 explosions on 28 and 30 May 1998. Both states declared a moratorium on further testing shortly afterwards. Independent seismologists have challenged official claims about the number and yields of these nuclear tests.

³⁵ See Reddy, C. Rammanohar; "Nuclear weapons versus schools for children: an estimate of the cost of the Indian nuclear weapons programme"; and Ramana, M. V. and Gadekar, S., "The price we pay: from uranium to weapons", eds M. V. Ramana and C. Rammanohar Reddy, *Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream* (Orient Longman: New Delhi, 2003).

³⁶ Urbeen Javid, Marium Kamal; "The Mumbai Terror '2008' and its Impact on the Indo- Pak Relations" *South Asian Studies A Research Journal of South Asian Studies* Vol. 28, No.1.

³⁷ 2008 - Mumbai Attack; Available at, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak_2008.htm.

Changing contours of Narendra Modi's Pakistan Policy :- The priorities of the government led by Narendra Modi include: cyber security, trade and power partnerships (*Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership*), the “Asian Solidarity” project, renewable energy, countering terrorism³⁸, a maritime strategy of security in the “Indian Ocean region”, diversification of diplomatic partnerships with a multitude of countries, strategic autonomy, a well-grounded diplomatic relation with the United States, a constructive relation with China, based on trust and cooperation, development of the traditional relation with Russia, improvement in the attractiveness of the Indian economy for foreign investors, by developing the economic diplomacy of India to its full potential, as well as a policy that pays attention to India’s neighbouring territories.³⁹ Under Narendra Modi’s administration, India follows a distinct kind of foreign policy, that some academic scholars defined as a “particular Modi doctrine”, while others considered it to be a continuation of Modi’s predecessors, with some “little changes of style and manner.” In order to enhance its global connectivity, Modi’s regime laid emphasis on “neighbour’s first policy” which can be visualised from Narendra Modi’s address at the general debate of the 69th session of the United Nations General Assembly

*“A nation’s destiny is linked to its neighbourhood. That is why my government has placed the highest priority on advancing friendship and cooperation with her neighbours.”*⁴⁰ But “a failed or blocked diplomatic relation” with Pakistan, Modi’s regime tried to build *a ring of diplomatic engagements against terrorism*, with the countries which had commercial relations with Pakistan. According to the analysts, the idea of concluding bilateral treaties on countering terrorism with countries from the Middle East (United Arab Emirates) or of visiting countries in Central Asia, as well as Saudi Arabia, in order to receive diplomatic support and initiate a common battle front against terrorism, represented the substantiation of a diplomatic direction of “containment”, assumed by Pakistan. We also must note Modi’s insistence with the UN, in order to adopt *an ‘Extended Convention on International Terrorism’*, as another diplomatic instrument in this direction.⁴¹ Thus, the policy implemented by the Modi government focuses on surrounding Pakistan and isolating it among the neighbouring countries and targeting its relation with its strategic partners. Through his numerous visits abroad, through the offers of advantageous partnership made to these partners, Modi attempted to reduce Pakistan’s political position of favourite country, in relations with countries such as China, America, Afghanistan, the entire Arab world – a position traditionally assumed by these countries.

³⁸ Arun Mohan Sukumar;- A data-driven analysis of Mr. Modi’s foreign policy interventions in his second year in office indicates no sharp disjuncture from the stated views of previous governments”, www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed, accessed on February 8th 2016.

³⁹ www.brookings.edu/research/options/2014/08/28-modi-100-days-foreign-policy-madan.

⁴⁰ India’s Neighbourhood Policy: Challenges and Prospects by Angana Das available at www.jgu.edu.in/JJIA/PDF/vol4/Angana-Das.pdf

⁴¹ <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/pm-modi-global-push-aggressive-foreign-policy-will-it-work/1/487299.html>.

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Project:- The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), is a \$46 billion Chinese investment in Pakistan's energy and transportation sectors. As part of China's One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, CPEC is designed to promote regional connectivity among Pakistan, China, and Eurasia.⁴² China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is bound to have geopolitical implications for Pakistan and the broader region, especially given the scale of the proposed investments and its connection to OBOR.⁴³ This investment also takes place at a time when the Indo-Pakistan relationship is marred with suspicions and hostilities, with several incidents such as cross-border skirmishes, allegations of cross-border terrorism. The routing of the corridor through Gilgit-Baltistan, which is claimed by India, has prompted protests by the government in New Delhi.⁴⁴ As India is not happy with the corridor so it seems to be a factor in deteriorating the Indo- Pak relations.

India's Intervention in Afghanistan:- India's objectives in Afghanistan can be visualised from a carefully calculated assessment of its domestic, regional, and global interests. Countering Pakistan's influence is certainly one of India's major goals, besides Indian government pursues a broad range of interests in Afghanistan that go beyond simply obstructing its principal adversary like, Prevent Anti-India Terrorism, Undermine Pakistani and Taliban Influence in Afghanistan, Increase Access to Central Asia, Project Power and Demonstrate Global Interests, India's Strategies in Afghanistan, Seek Political Influence in Afghanistan Provide Development Aid and Seek Economic Influence, Regionalize Solutions to Afghan Security and Stability Problem, Project Power, Provide Military Assistance.⁴⁵ Pakistan perceives India's efforts to gain influence in Afghanistan as a deliberate strategy of encirclement that is aimed at trapping and ultimately destroying Pakistan between hostile fronts.⁴⁶ Therefore Islamabad's overriding objective in Afghanistan is to block Delhi's own penetration into the country by helping to foster a pro-Pakistani administration in Kabul.⁴⁷

42 China Radio International, *Full Text: Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Belt and Road*, report, March 29, 2015, http://english.cri.cn/12394/2015/03/29/2941s872030_1.htm.

43 "GDP Ranking Data," The World Bank, 2015, <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table>

44 Christian Wager; "*The Effects of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor on India-Pakistan Relations*", Stiftung Wissenschaft and Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs, April 2016, p.3.

45 Larry Hanayer, Peter Chalk; "*India's and Pakistan's Strategies in Afghanistan-Implications for the United States and the Region*" Occasional papers ,Published by the RAND Corporation 2012, pp. 11-22

46 Because Islamabad views Afghanistan through the prism of its hostile relations with Delhi, any Indian push into the western neighbour can only be interpreted in zero-sum terms and as a deliberately orchestrated, malicious action designed to exploit extant indigenous tensions in Afghanistan. See, for instance, Ganguly and Howenstein, 2009, pp. 134–135. See also William Maley, "*Afghanistan and Its Region*," in J. Alexander Thier, ed., "*The Future of Afghanistan*", Washington, D.C.:U.S. Institute of Peace, 2009, p. 84; Abshire and Browne, 2011, p. 69; and Elizabeth Roche, "India, Pakistan's 'Proxy War' in Afghanistan," Agence France-Presse, March 3, 2010.

47 Ben Arnoldy, "*How the Afghanistan War Became Tangled in India vs. Pakistan Rivalry*," Christian Science Monitor, January 20, 2011.

Mass Uprising:- The uprising in 2008,2010 and 2016 is widely perceived to be different from late 1980s and early 1990s .M.K. Narayan Indias former National Security Advisor wrote that he sees as the new insurgency in Kashmir; “No evidence has surfaced that the Lashker-e Taiba or the Jaish e Mohammad are involved in violence, though Hizbul Mujahideen cadres are present , in contrast to earlier phases of trouble in Kashmir, the Present movement is almost entirely home grown. The spontaneity of many ‘mini-uprisings’ demands a different explanation from earlier ones, for it smacks of near total alienation of an entire generation of young Kashmiris angry with the present state of affairs.⁴⁸ This mass uprising has deteriorated indo-pak relation as the indian government views that this mass uprising is funded and backed by Pakistan

CONCLUSION

The indo Pak peace process in the form of composite dialogue process seems viable approach to find appropriate solutions to old and complex problems. The main achievement of composite dialogue process has been in the area of CBMs designed to enhance India- Pakistan contacts and connectivity. It is imperative to say that dialogue process has not succeeded in resolving any of the major issue in dispute like Jammu and Kashmir, Siachen, Tulbul Navigation Project and Sir-Creek. Progress on these issues has not been satisfactory due to unreasonable position and mutual distrust of the two neighbours. However, the success of the peace process /composite dialogue process depends completely on the importance both states give to it. All the historical orientation of differences converges on a single ground of Kashmir dispute. However, this problem is the core issue and any hope for peace and cooperation in Indo-Pak relation lies in the resolution of this conflict. It persistently influenced Pakistan’s Policy toward towards India. For a durable peace and stability of the subcontinent, there is a need that the leadership of India and Pakistan realistically visualizes the future of the region and accepts the ground realities through an optimistic mindset. Embarking upon the path of promoting trade and commerce, alongside making headway for the durable solution of core political issues and bridging the trust deficit, is the best way forward. In collaboration with the Kashmiri leadership, India and Pakistan will have to find a durable solution for Kashmir, the major irritant and potential threat. Thus India and Pakistan must continue talking to each other, remain engaged in negotiations, take all measures for the promotion of peace and tranquillity, initiate more CBMs and develop their economies to eradicate poverty widespread among their masses. This is only possible by giving peace a chance, ending antagonism by bringing concord among the leadership and the people of two countries. This process would provide opportunities for enhancing economic development and social integration in the subcontinent.

⁴⁸ Happpymoon; “The Kashmir Uprising and India- Pakistan Relation: A Need for Conflict Resolution , not Management”, Asie Vision, No 90 Ifri December, 2016, p.19

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